An earlier post noted reports that the insurgency has started to fragment into, for ease of description, native and foreign elements; the former comprises the remnants of Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime and its supporters within the Sunni community, whereas the latter consists of the al-Qaeda-aligned, al-Zarqawi-led foreign terrorists who have flowed into Iraq since the end of the war. While each group almost certainly contains some personnel more closely-aligned with the other, their interests have started to diverge since the successful Iraqi elections, from which the Iraqi Sunni minority unwisely abstained at the behest of their de facto leadership. Faced with the evidence of their failure to stop the nascent democracy at its inception, the native component of the insurgency, according to some reports not yet proved, appeared to be reconsidering its resistance and moving toward a constructive place in the new Iraq. Whether those reports ultimately prove to be true or false may become largely beside the point in whatever happens next.
This morning's car bombing in a Shia city near Baghdad has, at current count, killed more than 115 people and severely injured scores more. Whether the act itself was perpetrated by native insurgents or foreign fighters, there is no doubt that it is the work of the Sunni minority or elements acting in concert with them. For those keeping score, this is the same Sunni minority which prospered from the illegitimate reign of Hussein his relentless repressions of the Shiite majority and Kurdish minority within Iraq; these latter groups have united behind the budding political process, albeit with distinct political concerns.
Leadership in the new democracy is not the Sunnis' due by either works or numbers; their past history of assuming a place of superiority and maintaining their illegitimate authority by force is not forgotten by the formerly-repressed and now-ascendant Shiites and Kurds. The Sunnis' are, seemingly, unable to either understand their new place in Iraq or to extricate themselves from their alliance with foreign terrorists. A solid majority of the Iraqi populace has made their voices heard in support of freedom and democracy and will now take control of the apparatus and alliances of the new Iraqi government; as the death toll amongst this populace continues to mount owing to Sunni and Sunni-supported terror, how long will it be before their patience ends and their instinct for self-preservation takes over? How long will it be before the power of the new Iraqi state is directed against the Sunni minority which seeks its destruction and which has allied with the enemies of the state?
Whether soon after the formation of the new government or later, after efforts to bring the Sunnis into the fold have failed, when that action finally begins it will be difficult to stop and its effects will persist long after it ends. The Sunni rank-and-file have a very short window of opportunity to make their voices heard above the actions of those terrorists they have, to this point, actively-supported with their bodies and resources and passively-supported through their silence.
28 February 2005
25 February 2005
TGIS: Thank God It's Schadenfreude! (2)
This week's joy in the misfortune of others comes courtesy of The Arizona Republic and the Associated Press (from Wednesday, February 23; link good at time of posting):
A caller to Chicago station WKSC-FM boasted about how he took part in a bank stick-up. A bank employee was listening and was amazed by the details in the caller's description of the robbery.[Previous TGIS]
The bank employee called authorities and the FBI was able to trace the cellphone used to call the station. Randy Washington was arrested and has been charged with bank robbery, along with another man.
The FBI is also searching for four other alleged accomplices. Washington denies the allegation. He says he called the radio station to win a prize.
24 February 2005
Institutional Dotage (4) (Second Update)
It seems I spoke too soon in concluding that the United Nations now, belatedly, agrees with former Secretary of State Colin Powell's assessment of the mass ethnic killings in Darfur as a genocide; it seems belated is just not late enough when it comes to the U.N. As Professor Kenneth Anderson points out in his Law of War and Just War Theory Blog, the U.N. has concluded that the Darfur situation does not legally constitute genocide; their conclusion rests on their finding that the killings in Sudan, while extensive and ethnically-based, were not carried-out with the requisite intent to destroy an ethnic group in whole or in part.
As Professor Anderson notes, the international community has, since the 1990s, consistently relaxed this legal definition to fit situations like those in Bosnia and Guatemala; in both of these instances, the United Nations, reflecting the general consensus of the international community, made findings of genocide despite relatively weak evidence of requisite intent on the perpetrators' parts. This trend has been accepted by some in the academic community, redefining the crime of genocide without particular reference to the specific requisite intent element which, in Anderson's words, "turns genocide into any mass murder of an identifiable group of people." So what's happened now to reverse this trend despite the horrific evidence from Darfur? Anderson concludes:
As Professor Anderson notes, the international community has, since the 1990s, consistently relaxed this legal definition to fit situations like those in Bosnia and Guatemala; in both of these instances, the United Nations, reflecting the general consensus of the international community, made findings of genocide despite relatively weak evidence of requisite intent on the perpetrators' parts. This trend has been accepted by some in the academic community, redefining the crime of genocide without particular reference to the specific requisite intent element which, in Anderson's words, "turns genocide into any mass murder of an identifiable group of people." So what's happened now to reverse this trend despite the horrific evidence from Darfur? Anderson concludes:
Along comes Darfur, however, in the context of reflexive anti-Americanism on the part of the so-called international community - if the US is for it, we must be against! - combined with the real politik, which will increasingly rear an ugly head, of commercial interests of China and Russia. And all of a sudden, somehow, mysteriously, the great and good of the international community suddenly rediscover a high threshold of specific intent for genocide. Mind, I was never in favor of lowering it. But if you do lower it for Bosnia, Guatemala, and elsewhere, then you have an obligation not to arbitrarily raise it again when you take up Darfur.Thus it was that in his recent essay in The Wall Street Journal Secretary General Kofi Annan spoke only in passing of "war criminals" who perpetrated "the abominable crimes in Darfur". Abominable, but not genocidal; the nuance is critical for the modern United Nations, but I suspect that it's lost on the survivors in Darfur.
23 February 2005
Institutional Dotage (4) (Update)
New York Times columnist Nicholas D. Kristof has acquired an archive of photographs and documents from African Union monitors who have traveled within the Darfur region to document the ongoing genocide; this morning, he publishes a portion of this archive online. The inhumanity of the crisis is graphically demonstrated by the photographs and put into disturbing context by the content of a document contained in the archive and believed to be authentic:
UPDATE TO THE UPDATE: VodkaPundit also comments on the impact of the African Union archive photos and documents published in Kristof's column; he also links to Claudia Rosett's column in OpinionJournal concerning the broader United Nations crises about which I've been writing in this series of posts.
[SECOND UPDATE]
Dated last August, the document calls for the "execution of all directives from the president of the republic" and is directed to regional commanders and security officials.While the document's authenticity has not yet been definitively established, it at least preliminarily provides a critical link between the Janjaweed militia groups perpetrating the genocide and the government of Sudan, which has heretofore denied active complicity and which has been supported within the United Nations Security Council by Russia and China. Links to earlier reports by Kristof are available adjacent to today's online column; he's been reporting this tragedy since its early days and his reports have been by no means a voice in the wilderness. Perhaps it's high time for the U.N. as, in Secretary General Kofi Annan's words, "humanity's instrument" for stopping genocide to take an interest.
"Change the demography of Darfur and make it void of African tribes," the document urges. It encourages "killing, burning villages and farms, terrorizing people, confiscating property from members of African tribes and forcing them from Darfur."
UPDATE TO THE UPDATE: VodkaPundit also comments on the impact of the African Union archive photos and documents published in Kristof's column; he also links to Claudia Rosett's column in OpinionJournal concerning the broader United Nations crises about which I've been writing in this series of posts.
[SECOND UPDATE]
22 February 2005
We Believed in Miracles
Today marks the 25th anniversary of the "Miracle on Ice" Olympic hockey game in which an upstart American squad defeated a powerhouse Soviet team amidst escalating Cold War tensions. The game is remembered for many reasons, not the least of which is announcer Al Michaels' in-the-moment and borderline hysterical "Do you believe in miracles?!" call as time ran out on the Soviets in the third period. I wasn't quite ten years old when the game took place, but I remember it as clearly as any event from childhood. Part of the reason it stands out for me is its place as one of three events from the early 1980s, events unrelated except in my own young mind. The Miracle on Ice took place first, followed in April 1981 by the launch of the space shuttle Columbia and in the Spring of 1982 by the Falklands War between Britain and Argentina.
I was born in 1970 in Northern England to American parents; my father, a U.S. Air Force officer, had returned from service in Vietnam and was stationed in the U.K. as an exchange officer with the Royal Air Force. I was born in the military hospital at R.A.F. Catterick (since transferred to the Royal Army and now known as the Catterick Garrison Marne Barracks); my ongoing interest in Britain has always been encouraged, if it needed any encouragement at all, by my mother, a dedicated Anglophile. Raised on military bases and amongst serving military members and their families, I was always surrounded by patriotic people who both spoke of duty to country and exemplified that duty through their daily actions. For many reasons, the Miracle on Ice and the launch of the first space shuttle fed my pride to be an American; the British response to the Falklands crisis similarly fed my pride in my British dual nationality.
There have been many events since which have rekindled my sense of patriotism, but I think those three events occurred at a time when that sense was more pure and less in need of explanation, justification, and circumspection. Perhaps it's a figment of nostalgia for the lost simplicity of childhood, but at times I miss that purity of feeling, for patriotism and other things. Such feelings may still be strong, but they are tempered by experience and never rise to my consciousness without some evaluation and understanding; it's an inescapable part of being a rational adult. Another aspect of that rational adulthood is a sense of loss for some of the good things of childhood, things like, for me, the Miracle on Ice. I still believe in miracles.
I was born in 1970 in Northern England to American parents; my father, a U.S. Air Force officer, had returned from service in Vietnam and was stationed in the U.K. as an exchange officer with the Royal Air Force. I was born in the military hospital at R.A.F. Catterick (since transferred to the Royal Army and now known as the Catterick Garrison Marne Barracks); my ongoing interest in Britain has always been encouraged, if it needed any encouragement at all, by my mother, a dedicated Anglophile. Raised on military bases and amongst serving military members and their families, I was always surrounded by patriotic people who both spoke of duty to country and exemplified that duty through their daily actions. For many reasons, the Miracle on Ice and the launch of the first space shuttle fed my pride to be an American; the British response to the Falklands crisis similarly fed my pride in my British dual nationality.
There have been many events since which have rekindled my sense of patriotism, but I think those three events occurred at a time when that sense was more pure and less in need of explanation, justification, and circumspection. Perhaps it's a figment of nostalgia for the lost simplicity of childhood, but at times I miss that purity of feeling, for patriotism and other things. Such feelings may still be strong, but they are tempered by experience and never rise to my consciousness without some evaluation and understanding; it's an inescapable part of being a rational adult. Another aspect of that rational adulthood is a sense of loss for some of the good things of childhood, things like, for me, the Miracle on Ice. I still believe in miracles.
21 February 2005
Institutional Dotage (4)
[Part One] [Part Two] [Part Three]
In prior portions of this running commentary, I argued that there is no longer any reason (as perhaps there once was) to assume that the United Nations is either relevant to or effective in addressing international security matters in the post-Cold War era. The time has come to ask hard questions about the U.N.'s continuing survival, its future role in America's affairs, and America's future participation in the U.N.'s. Four crises over the last few years answer those questions and demonstrate that the United Nations is no longer an effective or reliable participant in international security matters; that a refocused U.N. with a mission directed toward promotion of health, justice, and economic development within and among smaller states neither requires nor benefits from the United States assuming a leading role in its processes; and that the U.S. cannot ensure the continuing success of its own international security, economic, and democratic agendas while remaining entangled with the United Nations. All of these mean, in simplest terms, substantial American disengagement from the current United Nations.
What are these crises and what do they tell us about the current state of the U.N. and its future prospects? The first concerns the ongoing Darfur (Sudan) genocide. Following the horrifying Rwandan genocide in the mid-1990s, many within the international diplomatic community fretted publicly over what had occurred on their watch and looked to the United Nations to put in place measures to prevent future genocides; it is a role the U.N. willingly accepted and which Secretary-General Kofi Annan continues to promote, despite acknowledged failures in a new African genocide ("UN seeking to avert a 'new Rwanda'"):
The latter two points have all the hallmarks of a bad joke. When faced with the Rwandan genocide, even after it had been identified as such (despite American interference, according to U.N. officials), the U.N., by its own admission, "failed to act". When faced with the ethnic mass-killings by Saddam Hussein in the Kurdish regions of Iraq, the U.N. failed to take decisive action; it was the leadership of the United States in the first Gulf War and its ongoing enforcement of the Northern Iraqi "No-Fly" Zone which ended Hussein's capacity to harm the Kurds.
Then-Secretary of State Colin Powell was the first diplomatic leader to call the bloodbath in Darfur what it is -- a genocide; while the United Nations now agrees with his assessment, its lack of coherent action to definitively end the the genocide can only be interpreted as a lack of either will or capacity to do so. Whichever is the case, neither alternative speaks to the U.N.'s preeminence in this crucial international peace and security arena. Nonetheless, as quoted by The Weekly Standard, Annan continued to promote their ongoing role: "Humanity must respond by taking action in its own defense. Humanity's instrument for that purpose must be the United Nations, and specifically the Security Council." Here, however, the disproportionate and disruptive power of the veto within the Security Council (which I discussed earlier) prevents necessary action by the U.N.; in this case, Russia's and China's commercial relationships with the oil-rich Sudanese government have prompted them to oppose both the creation of a modest international military presence in the Darfur region and the imposition of meaningful sanctions against the Sudanese government, which has supported the genocide perpetrators. As The Weekly Standard notes, "we're left with toothless Security Council resolutions and vows of tribunals for those committing war crimes, but nothing to stop the crimes in progress." While many have agreed with Secretary-General Annan's recapitulation of the genocide problem, few seem convinced that the United Nations is the savior needed.
In only one of the five points outlined by Annan has the U.N. displayed a coherent agenda and, more importantly, taken visible and consequential actions. At least as to the genocides in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, the U.N. has shown some ability to establish credible, deliberate (perhaps overly deliberate) tribunals to assess and document ethnic mass crimes and to punish those responsible. While success in this area does not make up for the United Nations' near-complete failures in the other areas of the genocide problem, it does point to a possible future role for the institution, a limited and less powerful role perhaps, but also one more focused and more effective, and ultimately more valuable for all.
Annan has recognized these limitations and yet begs for more patience from America. In a remarkable mea culpa to be published in tomorrow's Wall Street Journal (available from their free online service, OpinionJournal):
[Update]
In prior portions of this running commentary, I argued that there is no longer any reason (as perhaps there once was) to assume that the United Nations is either relevant to or effective in addressing international security matters in the post-Cold War era. The time has come to ask hard questions about the U.N.'s continuing survival, its future role in America's affairs, and America's future participation in the U.N.'s. Four crises over the last few years answer those questions and demonstrate that the United Nations is no longer an effective or reliable participant in international security matters; that a refocused U.N. with a mission directed toward promotion of health, justice, and economic development within and among smaller states neither requires nor benefits from the United States assuming a leading role in its processes; and that the U.S. cannot ensure the continuing success of its own international security, economic, and democratic agendas while remaining entangled with the United Nations. All of these mean, in simplest terms, substantial American disengagement from the current United Nations.
What are these crises and what do they tell us about the current state of the U.N. and its future prospects? The first concerns the ongoing Darfur (Sudan) genocide. Following the horrifying Rwandan genocide in the mid-1990s, many within the international diplomatic community fretted publicly over what had occurred on their watch and looked to the United Nations to put in place measures to prevent future genocides; it is a role the U.N. willingly accepted and which Secretary-General Kofi Annan continues to promote, despite acknowledged failures in a new African genocide ("UN seeking to avert a 'new Rwanda'"):
As he has done repeatedly since becoming Secretary-General, Mr. Annan acknowledged in that speech that the UN Secretariat, the Security Council, national governments and the international media had all failed to pay enough attention to the gathering signs of disaster in Rwanda. And as the signs mounted, they failed to act.Annan's "fitting memorial" to the then-ten-years-gone victims of the Rwandan genocide (and of little or no effect for the 2.5 million people affected by the ongoing Sudanese genocide) was to appoint "a special adviser on the prevention of genocide" and to establish a "plan of action" composed of five truisms and platitudes: "Preventing armed conflict"; "Protecting civilians in armed conflict"; "Ending impunity"; "Ensuring early, clear warning"; and "Taking swift and decisive action". The U.N. has relatively little control over the first two points, having (by design) no independent military capability or (by practice) reliable civilian command-and-control structure; to recognize these as two points as among the five defined keys for success is to admit by implication that the United Nations is a fish-out-of-water in this area.
As a result, some 800,000 women, children and men were killed in Rwanda within the space of just 100 days . . . .
While recognizing the reality of genocide is important, Secretary-General Annan said in his Geneva address, he also warned that "we must not be held back by legalistic arguments about whether a particular atrocity meets the definition of genocide or not. By the time we are certain, it may often be too late to act."Therefore, preventing genocide requires moving more quickly and seriously to stem large-scale abuses of human rights, especially when directed against ethnic, racial or religious groups.
The latter two points have all the hallmarks of a bad joke. When faced with the Rwandan genocide, even after it had been identified as such (despite American interference, according to U.N. officials), the U.N., by its own admission, "failed to act". When faced with the ethnic mass-killings by Saddam Hussein in the Kurdish regions of Iraq, the U.N. failed to take decisive action; it was the leadership of the United States in the first Gulf War and its ongoing enforcement of the Northern Iraqi "No-Fly" Zone which ended Hussein's capacity to harm the Kurds.
Then-Secretary of State Colin Powell was the first diplomatic leader to call the bloodbath in Darfur what it is -- a genocide; while the United Nations now agrees with his assessment, its lack of coherent action to definitively end the the genocide can only be interpreted as a lack of either will or capacity to do so. Whichever is the case, neither alternative speaks to the U.N.'s preeminence in this crucial international peace and security arena. Nonetheless, as quoted by The Weekly Standard, Annan continued to promote their ongoing role: "Humanity must respond by taking action in its own defense. Humanity's instrument for that purpose must be the United Nations, and specifically the Security Council." Here, however, the disproportionate and disruptive power of the veto within the Security Council (which I discussed earlier) prevents necessary action by the U.N.; in this case, Russia's and China's commercial relationships with the oil-rich Sudanese government have prompted them to oppose both the creation of a modest international military presence in the Darfur region and the imposition of meaningful sanctions against the Sudanese government, which has supported the genocide perpetrators. As The Weekly Standard notes, "we're left with toothless Security Council resolutions and vows of tribunals for those committing war crimes, but nothing to stop the crimes in progress." While many have agreed with Secretary-General Annan's recapitulation of the genocide problem, few seem convinced that the United Nations is the savior needed.
In only one of the five points outlined by Annan has the U.N. displayed a coherent agenda and, more importantly, taken visible and consequential actions. At least as to the genocides in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, the U.N. has shown some ability to establish credible, deliberate (perhaps overly deliberate) tribunals to assess and document ethnic mass crimes and to punish those responsible. While success in this area does not make up for the United Nations' near-complete failures in the other areas of the genocide problem, it does point to a possible future role for the institution, a limited and less powerful role perhaps, but also one more focused and more effective, and ultimately more valuable for all.
Annan has recognized these limitations and yet begs for more patience from America. In a remarkable mea culpa to be published in tomorrow's Wall Street Journal (available from their free online service, OpinionJournal):
Some decry what they see as a lack of principle in U.N. decision-making, pointing to the compromises that inevitably emerge from a body of 191 member states. Anyone who attacks the U.N. for failing to serve the global interest should, as part of that exercise, critically examine the decisions of each nation within the body. They will find that there is plenty of criticism to go round. But they should also remember that the U.N., like the U.S. and other great democracies, is a work in progress--always struggling to lessen the gap between reality and the ideals which gave it birth. That such a gap exists is all the more reason why those who value freedom and peace should work to build the U.N. up, not tear it down.More later . . . .Of course the U.N. is far from perfect--even if some of the recent allegations made about it have been overblown. The interim report of Paul Volcker's independent inquiry has helped put the Oil For Food program in perspective. Some of the more hyperbolic assertions about it have been proven untrue.
Yet I am the first to admit that real and troubling failures--ethical lapses and lax management--have been brought to light. I am determined, with the help of member states, to carry through the management reforms which are clearly called for by Mr. Volcker's findings.
Even more shocking are widespread cases of sexual exploitation and abuse of minors by peacekeepers and U.N. officials in the Congo and other African countries. Both the U.N. Secretariat and the member states have been too slow to realize the extent of this problem, take effective measures to end it, and punish the culprits. But we are now doing so, and I am determined to see it through.
. . . .
The U.N. cannot expect to survive into the 21st century unless ordinary people throughout the world feel that it does something for them--helping to protect them against conflict (both civil and international), but also against poverty, hunger, disease and the erosion of their natural environment. And in recent years, bitter experience has taught us that a world in which whole countries are left prey to misgovernment and destitution is not safe for anyone. We must turn the tide against disease and hunger, as well as against terrorism, the proliferation of deadly weapons and crime--starting, urgently, with decisions from the Security Council to end the abominable crimes in Darfur and bring war criminals to international justice.
[Update]
20 February 2005
A Hard Lesson in Democracy (Update)
This afternoon, Time magazine reports that various American officals have been meeting secretly with former Ba'athist leaders heading considerable portions of the Sunni resistance; while these "'back channel' communications" are not officially sanctioned by or binding upon either the interim or elected Iraqi governments or the U.S. government, they have made progress toward the twin objectives of the talks: to end the current insurgency and to facilitate the integration of these militant Sunni elements into the now-established Iraqi political process.
It should be noted that these talks are not necessarily on the verge of a breakthrough, but they are very promising. Also, the communications have been with the Ba'athist/Sunni components of the insurgency, not with the al-Qaeda-aligned al-Zarqawi contingent; however, each of the two groups, although distinct in outlook and leadership, has found its fate effectively dependent on the continuing viability of the other's fighting efforts. Whereas the al-Zarqawi-led fighters seek the destruction of the prospective Iraqi state and the annihilation of the predominately-American foreign military presence in Iraq, as John Hinderaker notes in Power Line, the Ba'athist/Sunni insurgents' agenda has been more political:
In an earlier post, I argued that the Sunnis' catastrophic mistake in rebelling against and abstaining from the then-uncertain Iraqi political process could be remedied only by a Sunni rank-and-file willing to defy their short-sighted and self-serving leadership. It was implicit in that argument that the leadership themselves would not see the error of their ways or adopt a coherent solution to their dilemma; in this, hopefully, I will be proved both pessimistic and wrong. According to Time, the insurgent Iraqis said to their counterparts, "We are ready to work with you." According to Reuters, "The insurgents said their aim was to establish a political identity that can represent disenfranchised Sunnis." I am now hopeful that these insurgent leaders have learned, more quickly than I would have thought possible, the "hard lesson in democracy" about which I earlier posted.
It should be noted that these talks are not necessarily on the verge of a breakthrough, but they are very promising. Also, the communications have been with the Ba'athist/Sunni components of the insurgency, not with the al-Qaeda-aligned al-Zarqawi contingent; however, each of the two groups, although distinct in outlook and leadership, has found its fate effectively dependent on the continuing viability of the other's fighting efforts. Whereas the al-Zarqawi-led fighters seek the destruction of the prospective Iraqi state and the annihilation of the predominately-American foreign military presence in Iraq, as John Hinderaker notes in Power Line, the Ba'athist/Sunni insurgents' agenda has been more political:
[The Ba'athist/Sunni insurgents'] violence had two main strategic objectives: first, to prevent President Bush from being re-elected; second, to prevent the Iraqi election from going forward. Both failed. If they give up, the [al-Qaeda-aligned, al-Zarqawi-led] terrorists will be isolated and can much more easily be defeated.Thus, the apparently pragmatic current reassessment by the Ba'athist/Sunni insurgents could do as much to promote the downfall of the al-Zarqawi resistance as has the direct American-led military action thus far.
In an earlier post, I argued that the Sunnis' catastrophic mistake in rebelling against and abstaining from the then-uncertain Iraqi political process could be remedied only by a Sunni rank-and-file willing to defy their short-sighted and self-serving leadership. It was implicit in that argument that the leadership themselves would not see the error of their ways or adopt a coherent solution to their dilemma; in this, hopefully, I will be proved both pessimistic and wrong. According to Time, the insurgent Iraqis said to their counterparts, "We are ready to work with you." According to Reuters, "The insurgents said their aim was to establish a political identity that can represent disenfranchised Sunnis." I am now hopeful that these insurgent leaders have learned, more quickly than I would have thought possible, the "hard lesson in democracy" about which I earlier posted.
A Few Weeks in Limbo
This past week's column marks the season's end of the tastefully-named Gregg Easterbrook's "Tuesday Morning Quarterback" feature; each year, that final column officially begins the (mercifully short) dark period between the end of football season and the start of baseball season. For those you who have not yet enjoyed TMQ in its current incarnation on NFL.com or its previous lives on Slate or ESPN.com's Page 2, you're missing out.
You're not a football fan? It doesn't matter; when I was hooked, I didn't have more than a passing interest (no West Coast Offense puns intended). You're not American? As the numerous messages from Europe, Asia, and Australia throughout the season demonstrate, TMQ's appeal (possibly more so than American Football's) transcends nationality. You're not a reader? Get out those Hooked on Phonics tapes now; the new season begins in a few months and Easterbook's a sesquipedalian. (Why yes, I do have word-of-the-day toilet paper; however did you know?) This is much more than a mere football column; it's a way of life for its fans every Tuesday. Easterbook takes full advantage of the lack of length constraints on his web-based column and explores at length the ins-and-outs of professional football each week during the season (along with brief criticism of other topics). He brings a fresh angle to the game, masterfully using the holy trinity of sports writing tools: statistics, sarcasm, and haiku.
Easterbook's official biography tends to emphasize his professional and intellectual accomplishments as senior editor of The New Republic, a contributing editor of The Atlantic Monthly, a contributing editor of The Washington Monthly, a visiting fellow at The Brookings Institution, and published author (most recently of the outstanding The Progress Paradox); he is proof, however, that a man's avocation can count for much, even amongst impressive professional achievements. Yes, I enjoy his books and articles, but I don't generally feel a sense of malaise when I pick up one of the many magazines to which he regularly contributes and find nothing from him in that issue; I will feel a bit empty, however, next Tuesday and the Tuesday after that, and so on until next autumn. A TMQ reader quoted in this week's column puts it best (in haiku, of course):
You're not a football fan? It doesn't matter; when I was hooked, I didn't have more than a passing interest (no West Coast Offense puns intended). You're not American? As the numerous messages from Europe, Asia, and Australia throughout the season demonstrate, TMQ's appeal (possibly more so than American Football's) transcends nationality. You're not a reader? Get out those Hooked on Phonics tapes now; the new season begins in a few months and Easterbook's a sesquipedalian. (Why yes, I do have word-of-the-day toilet paper; however did you know?) This is much more than a mere football column; it's a way of life for its fans every Tuesday. Easterbook takes full advantage of the lack of length constraints on his web-based column and explores at length the ins-and-outs of professional football each week during the season (along with brief criticism of other topics). He brings a fresh angle to the game, masterfully using the holy trinity of sports writing tools: statistics, sarcasm, and haiku.
Easterbook's official biography tends to emphasize his professional and intellectual accomplishments as senior editor of The New Republic, a contributing editor of The Atlantic Monthly, a contributing editor of The Washington Monthly, a visiting fellow at The Brookings Institution, and published author (most recently of the outstanding The Progress Paradox); he is proof, however, that a man's avocation can count for much, even amongst impressive professional achievements. Yes, I enjoy his books and articles, but I don't generally feel a sense of malaise when I pick up one of the many magazines to which he regularly contributes and find nothing from him in that issue; I will feel a bit empty, however, next Tuesday and the Tuesday after that, and so on until next autumn. A TMQ reader quoted in this week's column puts it best (in haiku, of course):
TMQ's last shot.Thanks for another great season, Gregg.
The offseason starts Tuesday:
long time till next year.
18 February 2005
TGIS: Thank God It's Schadenfreude! (1)
This week's joy in the misfortune of others comes courtesy of James Taranto's "Best of the Web Today" column and The Times (U.K.) (both from Thursday, February 17; links good at time of posting):
WHEN 35 Greenpeace protesters stormed the International Petroleum Exchange (IPE) yesterday they had planned the operation in great detail.
What they were not prepared for was the post-prandial aggression of oil traders who kicked and punched them back on to the pavement.
"We bit off more than we could chew. They were just Cockney barrow boy spivs. Total thugs," one protester said, rubbing his bruised skull. "I’ve never seen anyone less amenable to listening to our point of view."
Another said: "I took on a Texan Swat team at Esso last year and they were angels compared with this lot." Behind him, on the balcony of the pub opposite the IPE, a bleary-eyed trader, pint in hand, yelled: "Sod off, Swampy."
True Professionalism (Update)
Regarding a previous post, Rakesh Khurana writes (in part):
As an aside, there is a correction that Marketplace will be making to the byline because the commentary was based on a co-authored chapter that I contributed to an edited volume, not a book I've written. I am in the process of writing a book on the historical and social evolution of business education in America, but alas it is still several months from completion.This topic is a broad one (this week's Economist asks, "Is the MBA responsible for moral turpitude at the top?") and two minutes on a radio program certainly cannot do justice to Professor Khurana's views. Meanwhile, the book referenced in the Marketplace program, to which he contributed, is available here; his earlier solo work, Searching for a Corporate Savior: The Irrational Quest for Charismatic CEOs, and an earlier volume to which he contributed, Harvard Business Review on Leadership at the Top, are also available.
17 February 2005
Conservative Commentators' Aid Society
As the president decamps for Belgium this coming week, I for one am concerned about the capacities of various conservative bloggers, columnists, and commentators to cope. The Belgians' reactions to Mr. Bush's mission, messages, and mere presence will almost certainly be uniformly negative, albeit exceptionally polite at the elevated levels within which the president will travel. Will our conservative pundits have adequate bandwidth both to cogently analyze the short-term and long-term effects of this important diplomatic mission and to devise sufficiently vitriolic terms for the Belgians? Let's not reinvent the wheel here! Instead, draw from (and hopefully build upon) the prior, masterful work done by Monty Python in their "Prejudice" sketch:
From Monty Python's Flying Circus, Episode 37, January 4, 1973.
Well now, the result of last week's competition when we asked you to find a derogatory term for the Belgians. Well, the response was enormous and we took quite a long time sorting out the winners. There were some very clever entries. Mrs. Hatred of Leicester said, "Let's not call them anything; let's iust ignore them!" And a Mr. St. John . . . said he couldn't think of anything more derogatory than "Belgians." But in the end we settled on three choices:
Number three: "The Sprouts" sent in by Mrs. Vicious of Hastings. Very nice!
Number two: "The Phlegms" from Mrs. Child Molester . . . .
But the winner was undoubtedly from Mrs. No Supper for You from Norwood in Lancashire: "Miserable Fat Belgian Bastards!"
From Monty Python's Flying Circus, Episode 37, January 4, 1973.
16 February 2005
Institutional Dotage (3)
[Part One] [Part Two]
Thomas P.M. Barnett, author of The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century, recognizes the difficulties in applying the Geneva Convention rules to terror suspects and recommends the development of "a new set of rules for capturing, processing, detaining and prosecuting such nonstate actors as transnational terrorists." Barnett continues that these new rules should be defined by a consortium of nations with interconnected economic interests, nations he describes variously as the "the good guys", the "functioning core of the global economy", and "the connected states . . . [with] a shared commitment to combating global terrorism." In making that recommendation, Barnett expressly rejects the active participation of the United Nations:
Curiously, though, Barnett backtracks when it comes to trying the terror suspects captured under the "new rules" he advocates. "As for the trials? Prisoners should be funneled toward the International Criminal Court, because you've got to make the UN happy at some point in the process." As I argued previously, I see no reason to assume the U.N.'s relevance or utility, or to seek its approval or cooperation in matters implicating our security or those of our ally states. I can appreciate the views of some that American courts lack the objectivity or appearance of objectivity necessary to judge the actions of our government and military, the evidence they gather, or the suspects they capture. I don't share those views, but I can understand them; notwithstanding, to get from that point to a conclusion that the International Criminal Court or another tribunal supported by the United Nations would supply whatever credibility or authority the courts of the United States may lack requires a leap of faith I'm not prepared to make.
More later . . . .
[Part Four]
Thomas P.M. Barnett, author of The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century, recognizes the difficulties in applying the Geneva Convention rules to terror suspects and recommends the development of "a new set of rules for capturing, processing, detaining and prosecuting such nonstate actors as transnational terrorists." Barnett continues that these new rules should be defined by a consortium of nations with interconnected economic interests, nations he describes variously as the "the good guys", the "functioning core of the global economy", and "the connected states . . . [with] a shared commitment to combating global terrorism." In making that recommendation, Barnett expressly rejects the active participation of the United Nations:
This is not a job for the UN. In a global legislative body where Libya gets to chair the Human Rights Commission (who's next, Sudan?), some punks really have gotten lucky.Why would the conduct of the international war on terror be too important to trust to the U.N.? Do you think the U.N. is too bureaucratic to act quickly on an immediate concern of critical long-term importance? Do you think the U.N.'s coddling of various terror-supporting and terrorist-harboring regimes would make it a fox guarding the proverbial henhouse? Do you think the U.N.'s feckless enforcement of its own resolutions on terror, human rights, and related matters disqualifies it from a leadership position in a key aspect of this war? I'd agree with you if you think the present U.N.'s pervasive corruption so damages whatever credibility it might otherwise bring to an eventual solution that it should be disqualified from participating. Choose your own reasoning and I'll meet you at the conclusion. In Barnett's words, "This is no job for the U.N."
What am I talking about here? A WTO-like entity for global counterterrorism. A body that would set the operating standards for both intracore police networking (like building that fabled terrorist database in the sky) and the rules of engagement (to include prisoner handling, detention, and interrogation) for whenever the member states' militaries venture into the gap looking for bad guys.
Curiously, though, Barnett backtracks when it comes to trying the terror suspects captured under the "new rules" he advocates. "As for the trials? Prisoners should be funneled toward the International Criminal Court, because you've got to make the UN happy at some point in the process." As I argued previously, I see no reason to assume the U.N.'s relevance or utility, or to seek its approval or cooperation in matters implicating our security or those of our ally states. I can appreciate the views of some that American courts lack the objectivity or appearance of objectivity necessary to judge the actions of our government and military, the evidence they gather, or the suspects they capture. I don't share those views, but I can understand them; notwithstanding, to get from that point to a conclusion that the International Criminal Court or another tribunal supported by the United Nations would supply whatever credibility or authority the courts of the United States may lack requires a leap of faith I'm not prepared to make.
More later . . . .
[Part Four]
15 February 2005
True Professionalism
Are business managers "genuine professionals" or mere functionaries? Harvard professor Rakesh Khurana provided an intriguing viewpoint on management professionalism during yesterday's broadcast of National Public Radio's "Marketplace" program (available online; Khurana's commentary runs from approximately 0:02:45 to 0:05:00 [RealPlayer required]). Khurana's view is that business managers owe duties both to company shareholders and to society as a whole. He notes that business management is widely perceived by the public to be unethical and he attributes this lack of current public regard to business managers' abandonment of the aspirational norms of "true professions" in favor of a "purely vocational approach".
While such criticism may play well in business schools, I think it misperceives the public's expectations of business generally. People expect businesses to act in their own self-interests and to place their shareholders' financial interests above the more general interests of their employees and communities; as more people become shareholders themselves through direct investment in stocks, indirect stock investment through mutual fund purchases or retirement saving, or passive investment by receiving stock options and grants as compensation, this generalized expectation has become a mandate to maximize wealth. There are alternatives within the marketplace: it always has been the option of shareholders to choose to forego some of their investments' profit-seeking for more noble purposes (consider, for example, the rise over the past few decades of "green" and other socially-responsible investment funds and companies with strong charitable or social business objectives); more pragmatically, managers' fiduciary duty demands that they act to preserve their business environment generally and their products' goodwill specifically; this may be called brand-building or promoted as corporate conscience, but it boils down to not killing the goose which lays the golden egg. It has long been recognized that it's bad business to sacrifice long-term viability for short-term profit.
In Khurana's formulation, managers should aspire to use their specialized knowledge for the public good, recognizing a duty to society that, when in conflict, is superior to their duties to their companies' shareholders. It won't fly. We live in a free, fragmented society rarely produces clear social norms that are sustained unchanged over time. To the extent we are able as a society to identify common values, we seek to protect those values by establishing objective, measurable standards by which we may judge business conduct; we don't rely on "true professionals" to look out for our interests and we certainly don't trust them to decide for us what those interests are.
Americans often view their capitalist system as a game, in which businesses (through their managers) are expected to play fair, observing the rules established for all competitors, but to otherwise play as hard and as ruthlessly as they are able. In our system, it's for the scoreboard to determine the winners and losers. That may be deemed messily unprofessional in academia, but it's the pinnacle of professionalism out here in the real world.
[Update]
While such criticism may play well in business schools, I think it misperceives the public's expectations of business generally. People expect businesses to act in their own self-interests and to place their shareholders' financial interests above the more general interests of their employees and communities; as more people become shareholders themselves through direct investment in stocks, indirect stock investment through mutual fund purchases or retirement saving, or passive investment by receiving stock options and grants as compensation, this generalized expectation has become a mandate to maximize wealth. There are alternatives within the marketplace: it always has been the option of shareholders to choose to forego some of their investments' profit-seeking for more noble purposes (consider, for example, the rise over the past few decades of "green" and other socially-responsible investment funds and companies with strong charitable or social business objectives); more pragmatically, managers' fiduciary duty demands that they act to preserve their business environment generally and their products' goodwill specifically; this may be called brand-building or promoted as corporate conscience, but it boils down to not killing the goose which lays the golden egg. It has long been recognized that it's bad business to sacrifice long-term viability for short-term profit.
In Khurana's formulation, managers should aspire to use their specialized knowledge for the public good, recognizing a duty to society that, when in conflict, is superior to their duties to their companies' shareholders. It won't fly. We live in a free, fragmented society rarely produces clear social norms that are sustained unchanged over time. To the extent we are able as a society to identify common values, we seek to protect those values by establishing objective, measurable standards by which we may judge business conduct; we don't rely on "true professionals" to look out for our interests and we certainly don't trust them to decide for us what those interests are.
Americans often view their capitalist system as a game, in which businesses (through their managers) are expected to play fair, observing the rules established for all competitors, but to otherwise play as hard and as ruthlessly as they are able. In our system, it's for the scoreboard to determine the winners and losers. That may be deemed messily unprofessional in academia, but it's the pinnacle of professionalism out here in the real world.
[Update]
14 February 2005
A Hard Lesson in Democracy
The news these past several hours confirmed a Shiite victory in the Iraqi elections, but a victory of much smaller proportions than projected during the vote counting (see, e.g., Al-Jazeera, Boston Globe, and The Times (U.K.) for general run-downs [links good at time of posting]). As was the case for so many years for the Palestinians under Arafat, the Sunnis have been led astray by their absolutist, militant leadership; offered a place of equality at the table, they chose to shun the offer in hopes of achieving a place of superiority that was not their due by either works or numbers. For the Palestinians, it took many years of fruitless struggle and, ultimately, Arafat's death for them to begin to recoup their political losses (and the jury's still out). One can hope that the Iraqi Sunnis will be more quick to learn their hard lesson in democracy: you do not win truly democratic elections by standing on the sidelines. Unlike the sham elections under the Sunni-dominated Ba'athists, in Iraqi elections henceforth all votes will count and all groups will have a voice.
With the results giving the Shiites a position much less than the two-thirds majority they would require to fill key government positions without cooperation from other groups, the value of that cooperation now rises exponentially. The impact of even a modest Sunni vote would have been amplified as the Sunnis now begin building coalitions to govern. By first overreaching in and then abstaining from the process, the Sunnis have fallen to the very bottom of the political heap in Iraq. This catastrophic mistake can be remedied now only if the rank-and-file transcend their leadership and accept the role offered them by the other major factions in the drafting of the Iraqi Constitution. Fortunately for the Sunnis, baseball is not a major draw in Iraq; if it were, some might be inclined to think that it always takes three bad swings to strike out. Here, their second mistake, if the Sunnis make it, will finish them for years to come.
[Update]
With the results giving the Shiites a position much less than the two-thirds majority they would require to fill key government positions without cooperation from other groups, the value of that cooperation now rises exponentially. The impact of even a modest Sunni vote would have been amplified as the Sunnis now begin building coalitions to govern. By first overreaching in and then abstaining from the process, the Sunnis have fallen to the very bottom of the political heap in Iraq. This catastrophic mistake can be remedied now only if the rank-and-file transcend their leadership and accept the role offered them by the other major factions in the drafting of the Iraqi Constitution. Fortunately for the Sunnis, baseball is not a major draw in Iraq; if it were, some might be inclined to think that it always takes three bad swings to strike out. Here, their second mistake, if the Sunnis make it, will finish them for years to come.
[Update]
13 February 2005
Class in a Classless Society
Driving home this evening, I listened to an outstanding discussion of the meanings of class in America; the archived program, "To the Best of Our Knowledge: Class Lessons" is available online (RealPlayer required). This is a topic I don't generally think much about, having been raised solidly within the middle class in a nation where nearly everyone self-identifies as within the middle class. Nonetheless, I found myself questioning what I really mean when I define myself or others as "middle class". Is "middle class" purely a state of mind, a reflection of the aspirational, egalitarian philosophy we all share as Americans? Can it be objectively defined by income level? Does it identify groups who enjoy high degrees of freedom within the workplace (but have not yet attained the status of "Capitalist Overlords")? Have "white-collar" and "blue-collar" lost their traditional meanings as we find ourselves an economic era characterized in part by lower-income "white-collar" professionals and higher-income "blue-collar" workers? All of these questions were raised and addressed by economics professor Michael Zweig, of the State University of New York at Stony Brook, in the especially compelling first segment of the program.
Institutional Dotage (2)
[Part One]
Although the United Nations and its scandals-du-jour have been in the mainstream and blogosphere news on a du jour basis lately, the one item which most prompted me to write was John Hinderaker's recent post on Power Line ("Moral Guidance from the U.N."), which noted that:
Since the U.N.'s founding, the number of nations worldwide has exploded; the body's membership reflects this, expanding from 51 states in 1945 to 191 in 2002. In large part, the collapse of the Communist Bloc and the subsequent spread of basic democracy has driven this proliferation. In many areas, natural ethnic divisions which were suppressed into totalitarian states fragmented into smaller, ethnicity-dominated states (Yugoslavia's division is an instructive example); each of these new states has a voice in the United Nations, which is both consistent with the U.N.'s founding principles and with democratic principles generally. Notwithstanding, the proliferation of states creates a louder cacaphony of voices and self-interested players, each seeking a place in the international dialogue and a place in the U.N.'s operations. The U.N.'s structure attempts both to cater to these developing states' idiosyncratic demands and to channel or control them to ensure the smooth operation of the instution as a whole. Where this structure falls apart is in failing to reconcile the two competing functions satisfactorily.
Whereas the rank-and-file of the U.N.'s membership (the General Assembly) and the bulk of its agenda are focused in the developing world, the permanent membership of the Security Council is undisputably an old boys' club of the immediately post-WWII developed (and amongst the developed, triumphant) world nations (comprising the United States, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, France, and China). If the U.N. were geared toward reconciling the specific interests of the developing world with the specific interests of the developed nations, it would possess far less authority but would be vested with much greater integrity. Perhaps the American liberals Hinderaker observes are on the right track in recognizing (at least implicitly) that political authority and moral authority are competing measures; forced to choose between the two, I for one would tend to agree that the latter would be of more modern value than the former. But the U.N.'s structure was not established to reconcile the new world with the establishment; the permanent members' veto power demonstrates that. These nations (or more properly and usually, a subset of one or two of them) act paternalistically as a check on the will of the General Council and the other members of the Security Council.
Is that democracy? Whatever the original reasoning behind that structuring, be it pragmatism (recognizing the U.N.'s limited resources without the ongoing, voluntary cooperation of the great powers), bribery (allowing supervotes to the superpowers to entice them to continue in an organization arrayed at various times against each of them), or something else entirely, is that democracy? While the residents of Animal Farm, like their counterparts in the United Nations, ended up with the dysfunctional "All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others", at least the animals started off as idealists proclaiming compete equality. Built on institutional inequity, perhaps the U.N. was built to last in an undemocratic world. As we seek now to build stronger democracies in an increasingly democratic world, it may be that true progress at the U.N. may be possible only by abandoning its legacy structures; that "cure" would likely kill the patient.
More later . . . .
[Part Three]
Although the United Nations and its scandals-du-jour have been in the mainstream and blogosphere news on a du jour basis lately, the one item which most prompted me to write was John Hinderaker's recent post on Power Line ("Moral Guidance from the U.N."), which noted that:
A basic assumption of American liberalism is that the United Nations occupies a higher moral plane than the United States. Thus, actions taken under the U.N.'s auspices are automatically vested with more moral authority than those taken unilaterally by the U.S.The reasoning behind this assumption escapes me completely. Is it a legacy of the past good works of the U.N.? Is it a remnant of the international hope and will which created the institution after World War II? Is it not grounded in any current reality? Hinderaker would think not: "[T]his belief rests on no evident empirical foundation." As much as it may perplex me, I've come to the conclusion that this assumption is a curiousity and a red herring which distracts from the real issue-- whether the United Nations can and should be saved.
Since the U.N.'s founding, the number of nations worldwide has exploded; the body's membership reflects this, expanding from 51 states in 1945 to 191 in 2002. In large part, the collapse of the Communist Bloc and the subsequent spread of basic democracy has driven this proliferation. In many areas, natural ethnic divisions which were suppressed into totalitarian states fragmented into smaller, ethnicity-dominated states (Yugoslavia's division is an instructive example); each of these new states has a voice in the United Nations, which is both consistent with the U.N.'s founding principles and with democratic principles generally. Notwithstanding, the proliferation of states creates a louder cacaphony of voices and self-interested players, each seeking a place in the international dialogue and a place in the U.N.'s operations. The U.N.'s structure attempts both to cater to these developing states' idiosyncratic demands and to channel or control them to ensure the smooth operation of the instution as a whole. Where this structure falls apart is in failing to reconcile the two competing functions satisfactorily.
Whereas the rank-and-file of the U.N.'s membership (the General Assembly) and the bulk of its agenda are focused in the developing world, the permanent membership of the Security Council is undisputably an old boys' club of the immediately post-WWII developed (and amongst the developed, triumphant) world nations (comprising the United States, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, France, and China). If the U.N. were geared toward reconciling the specific interests of the developing world with the specific interests of the developed nations, it would possess far less authority but would be vested with much greater integrity. Perhaps the American liberals Hinderaker observes are on the right track in recognizing (at least implicitly) that political authority and moral authority are competing measures; forced to choose between the two, I for one would tend to agree that the latter would be of more modern value than the former. But the U.N.'s structure was not established to reconcile the new world with the establishment; the permanent members' veto power demonstrates that. These nations (or more properly and usually, a subset of one or two of them) act paternalistically as a check on the will of the General Council and the other members of the Security Council.
Is that democracy? Whatever the original reasoning behind that structuring, be it pragmatism (recognizing the U.N.'s limited resources without the ongoing, voluntary cooperation of the great powers), bribery (allowing supervotes to the superpowers to entice them to continue in an organization arrayed at various times against each of them), or something else entirely, is that democracy? While the residents of Animal Farm, like their counterparts in the United Nations, ended up with the dysfunctional "All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others", at least the animals started off as idealists proclaiming compete equality. Built on institutional inequity, perhaps the U.N. was built to last in an undemocratic world. As we seek now to build stronger democracies in an increasingly democratic world, it may be that true progress at the U.N. may be possible only by abandoning its legacy structures; that "cure" would likely kill the patient.
More later . . . .
[Part Three]
12 February 2005
Institutional Dotage (1)
It rarely pays to make sweeping generalizations about generations when it comes to their politics. Blanket statements about "the Greatest Generation", "the Baby Boomers", "Generation X", "Generation Y", or "the SpongeBob Generation" (OK, I made the last one up) imply that viewpoints are essentially homogenous within the group described, that a group consensus has been somehow been found. Generalizations misfire, sacrificing genuine and substantial differences of outlook for the sake of intellectual simplicity and ease of description. Looking to the group actor making the generalization will usually reveal more: identification of another group's "views" serves to distinguish them, using the "us versus them" dichotomy to create increased cohesion within the group whose self-appointed representative makes the generalization in the first place.
Thus, I recognize that it's a bad start for me to begin generalizing about my parents' generation versus my own. Once we look through generational identity to individual characteristics and views, all generalizations tend to fall apart. I recognize my parents as very different in outlook from one another; I recognize them as a couple as very different in outlook from my acquaintances' parents; the trend holds the further afield I look. Nevertheless, I think it's fair to say that within groups there are some very limited number of shared values and viewpoints. Again, getting beyond very broad identification of these values and viewpoints is problematic: for instance, it's easy to identify "love of country" as a shared value, but to descend beyond that generic level to get into political detail or identify stands on particular issues immediately fragments the grouping into divergent political opinions. As if I could do otherwise, I'll go into this blather with the intention of remaining superficial.
Over the last several years, I've noticed a few significant political differences between large swaths of my generation and large swaths of my parents' generation. Two of these differences relate to each group's valuing of governmental institutions: One is each group's views on the value of Social Security; I don't plan to get into that topic now, but it's been on my mind of late, so perhaps another day I will. The other concerns the United Nations.
Both the United Nations leadership and observers in the press and media have recognized the U.N. as being in a current crisis; all have fallen short, however, in understanding the depth of the crisis and in attributing its cause to the numerous scandals which have embroiled the U.N. recently. The crisis is not a current situation brought on by current events and discrete scandals, but rather is the natural product of the obsolete structures and objectives of the U.N. As such, it is not treatable by making right the damage directly caused by the reported scandals and smoothing over the losses of good will associated therewith. To attempt to remedy the condition of the U.N. by fixing these outward indicators is akin to assuming that old age is a condition to be cured with a pill.
Where my generation will differ from our parents' is in asking whether the United Nations can and should be saved, rather than assuming that it is and always will be an ideal within the natural order of things. We may determine that it can be mended and elect to do so, but we will first ask that threshhold question; once asked, it will be asked again and again in subsequent years and, if the U.N. is to survive those years, the United Nations' leadership and membership must work to produce satisfactory answers to those questions. It will no longer be possible to ignore the questioners and assume that the past good works of the U.N. justify its continuing existence.
More later . . . .
[Part Two]
Thus, I recognize that it's a bad start for me to begin generalizing about my parents' generation versus my own. Once we look through generational identity to individual characteristics and views, all generalizations tend to fall apart. I recognize my parents as very different in outlook from one another; I recognize them as a couple as very different in outlook from my acquaintances' parents; the trend holds the further afield I look. Nevertheless, I think it's fair to say that within groups there are some very limited number of shared values and viewpoints. Again, getting beyond very broad identification of these values and viewpoints is problematic: for instance, it's easy to identify "love of country" as a shared value, but to descend beyond that generic level to get into political detail or identify stands on particular issues immediately fragments the grouping into divergent political opinions. As if I could do otherwise, I'll go into this blather with the intention of remaining superficial.
Over the last several years, I've noticed a few significant political differences between large swaths of my generation and large swaths of my parents' generation. Two of these differences relate to each group's valuing of governmental institutions: One is each group's views on the value of Social Security; I don't plan to get into that topic now, but it's been on my mind of late, so perhaps another day I will. The other concerns the United Nations.
Both the United Nations leadership and observers in the press and media have recognized the U.N. as being in a current crisis; all have fallen short, however, in understanding the depth of the crisis and in attributing its cause to the numerous scandals which have embroiled the U.N. recently. The crisis is not a current situation brought on by current events and discrete scandals, but rather is the natural product of the obsolete structures and objectives of the U.N. As such, it is not treatable by making right the damage directly caused by the reported scandals and smoothing over the losses of good will associated therewith. To attempt to remedy the condition of the U.N. by fixing these outward indicators is akin to assuming that old age is a condition to be cured with a pill.
Where my generation will differ from our parents' is in asking whether the United Nations can and should be saved, rather than assuming that it is and always will be an ideal within the natural order of things. We may determine that it can be mended and elect to do so, but we will first ask that threshhold question; once asked, it will be asked again and again in subsequent years and, if the U.N. is to survive those years, the United Nations' leadership and membership must work to produce satisfactory answers to those questions. It will no longer be possible to ignore the questioners and assume that the past good works of the U.N. justify its continuing existence.
More later . . . .
[Part Two]
11 February 2005
Leaving on a Jet Plane (2)
[Part One]
To continue the metaphorical overkill, the interior of the airliner is a mostly static environment for most of its passengers, as is the world outside the airliner for most of those not on the airliner. Each group, if it cares to notice, can see the relative motion of the other: the person on the ground sees the airliner cross the sky and the passenger on the airliner can see the ground pass him by. These are two separate environments moving past one another with little effect on one another.
The defining characteristic of the airliner for me is not the trip itself but the fact that the trip is of limited duration. We don't live on the airliner; we live at either end of the trip, at the origin or the destination. Because this airliner is on a one-way trip, here only the destination is important; to return to the origin is just to make it a new destination. The choice to board the airliner and to tolerate your time aboard is prompted only by a desire to reach the destination; if a passenger loses sight of that and begins to see the airliner as a destination or his time on the airliner as semi-permanent, how devalued will the destination seem when he disembarks voluntarily or is forced to do so by the tired flight crew?
Once any passenger reaches his destination, how long will he remain? That's my preoccupation at the moment. When I started this bloggarrhea, I remembered my days "in flux", preparing and moving in nearly every aspect of my life. Now, I have established myself in a career; I'm progressing and learning, becoming more expert, but not fundamentaly changing my professional position any longer. I'm physically established, a homeowner with more possessions than I can easily move on short notice; I acquire and discard continuously, but I'm now established as a man of property with a firm attachment to said property. I'm a happy husband and father, and no longer at sea emotionally. Even philosophically, after a major upheaval, I've become comfortable with my outlook; I feel challenged and engaged in a different way than when I was younger, questioning everything.
I've realized that I'm at my destination finally, albeit (hopefully) not at my final destination. I see also that I reached that destination some time ago without appreciating it. From curiousity, I started to wonder why it's taken so long to recognize that I'd stepped off my metaphorical airliner (last mention, I promise). The larger issue for me now is whether I can hold tight to the good in my present without jeopardizing the good in my future.
What comes next, and how do I know when to move forward?
To continue the metaphorical overkill, the interior of the airliner is a mostly static environment for most of its passengers, as is the world outside the airliner for most of those not on the airliner. Each group, if it cares to notice, can see the relative motion of the other: the person on the ground sees the airliner cross the sky and the passenger on the airliner can see the ground pass him by. These are two separate environments moving past one another with little effect on one another.
The defining characteristic of the airliner for me is not the trip itself but the fact that the trip is of limited duration. We don't live on the airliner; we live at either end of the trip, at the origin or the destination. Because this airliner is on a one-way trip, here only the destination is important; to return to the origin is just to make it a new destination. The choice to board the airliner and to tolerate your time aboard is prompted only by a desire to reach the destination; if a passenger loses sight of that and begins to see the airliner as a destination or his time on the airliner as semi-permanent, how devalued will the destination seem when he disembarks voluntarily or is forced to do so by the tired flight crew?
Once any passenger reaches his destination, how long will he remain? That's my preoccupation at the moment. When I started this bloggarrhea, I remembered my days "in flux", preparing and moving in nearly every aspect of my life. Now, I have established myself in a career; I'm progressing and learning, becoming more expert, but not fundamentaly changing my professional position any longer. I'm physically established, a homeowner with more possessions than I can easily move on short notice; I acquire and discard continuously, but I'm now established as a man of property with a firm attachment to said property. I'm a happy husband and father, and no longer at sea emotionally. Even philosophically, after a major upheaval, I've become comfortable with my outlook; I feel challenged and engaged in a different way than when I was younger, questioning everything.
I've realized that I'm at my destination finally, albeit (hopefully) not at my final destination. I see also that I reached that destination some time ago without appreciating it. From curiousity, I started to wonder why it's taken so long to recognize that I'd stepped off my metaphorical airliner (last mention, I promise). The larger issue for me now is whether I can hold tight to the good in my present without jeopardizing the good in my future.
What comes next, and how do I know when to move forward?
Leaving on a Jet Plane (1)
Without much nostalgia, I recall how recently my sense of self was a creature of what-comes-next. For years, everything seemed in flux: I was a student, always preparing for a career, knowing that the academics were not ends in and of themselves; I was an individual in that I could pick-and-choose my relationships and assume or abandon these almost at will; I was in transition physically and intellectually, not tied to any particular place, interest, or belief, although at any given moment I felt intensely dedicated to whichever places, interests, or beliefs I occupied and could not conceive of changing these.
Until we find our place in life, I think we exist in a bubble; conceptually, I see this bubble as most like an airliner on a one-way trip (bear with me on this). We make choices as to which airliner to board, and these choices are mostly but not entirely our own. Each of us chooses a destination, if only by process of elimination or by default, with some realization that that choice is important; it's always possible to return to your origin or to choose another destination, but to make those changes may be difficult generally, may be costly financially or in terms of lost time, may have collateral effects on others, and so on. At the very least, it may be embarassing to have to admit that you've chosen poorly or that you're poorly-suited to an otherwise fine destination. Even outstanding choices preclude other possibilities; you can't be everything all at once. To a lesser extent, your choice of destination or airliner is determined by external factors. An uneducated or unimaginative person may not know or care that some destinations exist. A materially-disadvantaged person may not have the option to travel in comfort on the airliner of his choice. Still, the uneducated can learn and the unimaginative can dream; any person can reach nearly any destination, although his trip may be longer, more difficult, or less comfortable than others'. Naive, perhaps, but who cares? I'm American.
Once on the airliner, we have some freedom of movement, but not much. Our choices are bound to a large extent by the strictures of our environment, the rules of others, and the whims of those in our immediate vicinity. Every so often, you find yourself stimulated by a chance meeting or conversation on an airliner, but on most trips you're not sitting next to me; thus, most trips are experiences to endure rather than to cherish. On the airliner you exist, but whether you become more than you were when you boarded is largely a function of what you bring on-board. Bring some work to do or a good book to read and you're better off generally than the passenger who sleeps through the trip or stares vacantly out the window for the duration.
More later . . . .
[Part Two]
Until we find our place in life, I think we exist in a bubble; conceptually, I see this bubble as most like an airliner on a one-way trip (bear with me on this). We make choices as to which airliner to board, and these choices are mostly but not entirely our own. Each of us chooses a destination, if only by process of elimination or by default, with some realization that that choice is important; it's always possible to return to your origin or to choose another destination, but to make those changes may be difficult generally, may be costly financially or in terms of lost time, may have collateral effects on others, and so on. At the very least, it may be embarassing to have to admit that you've chosen poorly or that you're poorly-suited to an otherwise fine destination. Even outstanding choices preclude other possibilities; you can't be everything all at once. To a lesser extent, your choice of destination or airliner is determined by external factors. An uneducated or unimaginative person may not know or care that some destinations exist. A materially-disadvantaged person may not have the option to travel in comfort on the airliner of his choice. Still, the uneducated can learn and the unimaginative can dream; any person can reach nearly any destination, although his trip may be longer, more difficult, or less comfortable than others'. Naive, perhaps, but who cares? I'm American.
Once on the airliner, we have some freedom of movement, but not much. Our choices are bound to a large extent by the strictures of our environment, the rules of others, and the whims of those in our immediate vicinity. Every so often, you find yourself stimulated by a chance meeting or conversation on an airliner, but on most trips you're not sitting next to me; thus, most trips are experiences to endure rather than to cherish. On the airliner you exist, but whether you become more than you were when you boarded is largely a function of what you bring on-board. Bring some work to do or a good book to read and you're better off generally than the passenger who sleeps through the trip or stares vacantly out the window for the duration.
More later . . . .
[Part Two]
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